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I. A Brief Survey of Profit Sharing,
Profit sharing may be defined as an ag~.:eement between an
employer and workers to pay a share of the profits or wealth created by the
organisation in addition to wages and direct incentives. It is a recognition
of the worker’s right to a share in the results of the organisation, just as the
right of those wllo provide the capital. Profit sharing is regarded frequently
as a direct incentive to employees whose extra efforts can increase the
profitability of an enterprise; it should not be confused with productivity
scheme s, ’however.
There are many ways in which profit sharing may be operated:
(i) it may be a cash distribution; (ii) it may take the form of share allocation
or of share option; (iii) it may apply to all workers or to certain categories;
(iv) the amount may be at the discretion of owners or determined by rule;
(v) profits shared may be a fixed percentage before tax, net profit ~ter tax,
a proportion of profit over a-specified minimum. The profitability of a firm
depends on many factors, sufficient capital, capable management and the efforts
o~ all the workers, therefore it would appear equitable that all interests should
share in the surplus remaining after each section has been reasonably remtmerated.
I
Some of the arguments against profit slmring are:- (i) if
v,
employees are encouraged to participate in a scheme of investment in a firm’s
shares, they may expect to be compensated even if the firm runs into difficulties;
(i1) many employees might prefer a cash bonus to investment in shares; (1~1) the
formula for calculation of shares is often too complex to be tmderstood by all
workers;(1v) employees may consider that profit sharing gives an illusion of
ownership without the power of control; (v) workers may begin to regard bonuses
or dividends as a right and resent their absence in unprofitable years; (vi)
i\ ,
if paid in cash it is likely to be xegarded as part of pay and hence lose the incentive
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or distribution of ownership advantage; (vii) it cannot be applied to public service
and other nonprofit organisations unless special arrmlgements are made. The
advantages of profit sharing are said to be: (i) employees acquire an interest
in the organisation as owners as well as workers; (H) profit sharing provides an
interest in the firm; (iii) good employees may be induced to join and to remain
with the firm; (iv) employees are encouraged to save; (v) by building up a common
purposes profit sharing may help to reduce conflict and therefore further public
interest which is often forgotten when colffrontations occur between management and
workers; (vi social justice is seen to exist when workers share in the profit of the
enterprise; (vi) profit sharing would involve a wider distribution of ownership in
the community.
Most writers on the subject of profit sharing stress some basic
principles: (i) basic pay to employees must take precedence over all other
interests, (11) there must be a reasonable proportion of profit for distribution to
staff; if the profit bonus is only a small fraction in relation to total dividends,
its psychological effect may be disastrous’ (1ii) the scheme should be simple
and clearly understood; (iv) there is emphasis that schemes can operate only in
successful firms and emmet be used to salvage a lost situat[on; (v) the scheme
must state who are eligible, e.g. full time employees, certain period of prior
service for eligibility, exclusion of certain staff, applicable to all staff; (vi)
many think that employees cannot be involved in sharing losses but benefits
must vary according to the profitability or otherwise of the firm; (vii) it is
important that a reasonable proportion of employees will voluntarily retain their
shareholdh/g. In voluntary shareholding staff should be able to opt for a cash
bonus instead o} shares as it is pointless to give shares which will be realised
immediately. In many organisations employees are assisted in acquiring shares
in the concern, by means of loans, payable over five years. During the repayment
period, sh.’u-es emmet usually be sold except ia exceptional circumstances; (viii)
there shottld be income tax concessions to encourage promotion of profit sharing
schemes (ix) the size of the firm does ,mr appear to be import,-mt as both large and small
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firms have introduced profit sharing successfully; what appears to be important
is a steady dividend; (x) schemes may fail to stimulate workers to greater
-.
effort as they have to wait too long for results; (xi) schemes are said to increase
loyalty to the organisation and lessen strikes.
There appears to be general agreement that unless the wage structure
is adequate, profit sharing is not possible. There must be good working
conditions, satisfactory pensions and sick pay schemes, particularly in the UK
and Ireland before profit sharing can be considered; although in the USA it
appears that schemes are introduced to provide pensions and other benefits,
workers in European countries do not appear to respond in such motivation.
European profit sharing companies tend to be those which have adequate fringe
benefits.
It would appear that for profit sharing to be successful there must
be a high standard of communication and consultation flowing each way between
management and workers. It would be unwise to expect too much from profit
sharing schemes alone. They will necessarily remove nor reduce conflict
over pay or conditions of work; usually workers prefer increases in basic
rates of pay rather than in what they regard as marginal or fringe benefits.
There is also the argmment that whereas basic pay remains, rewards based
on profits may fluctuate or be discretionary.
The Commission of The European Communities considered employee
participation in asset formation in a Memorandum issued in 1979. They were
"of the opinion that employee participation in productive capital formation constitutes
an efficient approach towards the fundamental goal -from a soe ial standpoint -
\
of greater justice in the distribution of total wealth. This asset formation policy
is furthermore a modern metals of regulating the economy and of controlling
t!hfflatton .
kg’
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The most important basic principles, which should tend to reinforce
the social aspect of incentives to individual savings are in the view of the
Commission:-
. A jointly negotiated asset benefit at a standard rate in absolute
value, as in the Federal l~epubl[c of Germany.
¯ Compulsory "frozen" participation of the wage earners in the
profits of ~mdertakings financed in part by the State, as in
France. Several forms of voluntary participation are operational
in Netherlands, the Federal l~epubl[c of Germany and in the United
Kingdom. Also ill France there is compulsory participation in
shareholding by employees in certain public enterprises. Similar
systems are to be fotmd, although optional, in Denmark, the United
Kingdom and in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Commission favours the sharing of profits by employees,
whether by free negotiation between the two sides of industry or within a legal
framework. Among the many objectives of such sharing schemes it was argued
that priority should be given to the social objectives, particularly to a fairer
distribution of wealth. Further objectives were:
¯
to ’ensure an overall level of saving necessary for the financing
of investments;
¯
to obtain greater participation in saving; ,
¯
to chmmel such saving towards medium and long term forms of
inve s tm ent;
¯ to maintain relatively stable prices by balancing incomes with
consumption, savh]gs and investment.
In order to encourage savings, countries must hnplement a policy to control
inflation as in times of accelerated inflation savers cml see their efforts largely
wiped out by currency depreciation; while the real value of interest paid to
savers c,’m be negative. It would therefore be necessary, the Commission argued,
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that, at least the low income groups, should have some kind of guar~-mtee that
medium and long term savings will keep their real value.
There is no EEC law on PS. The Commission recommends two
methods of PS. According tothe first employees in the private sector and the
government would pay their employees standard contributions in addition to
earnings which would be frozen for a certain period. The idea Would be for the
two sides in industry to negociate agreements on asset formation within a legal
framework. According to the second method, described as "more advanced",
employees would be given a frozen share in company profits, growth or capital
Ftmds trmlsferred to employees, preferably in the form of share certificates
could be limited to the employees of the particular company or could be extended
to a wider range of employees by assignment to a more or less general fund. It
is pointed out that limitation to own company is more’likely to bring about
improvement in the work atmosphere while funding is the more likely to bring
about nearer to equality in reward for employees of more profitable and less
profi table c ompanie s.
Following are short notes on the parctiees in some countries. Of
greatest interest for Ireland is the UK. In a booklet produced by CB[ ~978) what
is described’as a "checklist for management" is hnportant because almost
invariably schemes are introduced on the initiative of management, whose reasoning,
it is suggested,, should be on the following lines:-
"Why do we want a scheme ? The timescale is.important
here. A scheme with regular short-term pay-outs can
be used to reward performance but it is wise to consider
a scheme based on longer-term achievement if the objective
is to seek to increase employee involvement and commitment
to the company.
"~rl~o should belong to the scheme ? Should it be for executives,
or the whole worldorce ? Who should be excluded - non-executive
directoi-s, senior management, part-thne st~f?
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"What ratio is the scheme to be based on: net profits,
pre-tax profits, added value ? Should there be a ’triggering-
off’ device whereby a Certain profitpercentage has to be
reached before there can be a distribution ?
"How will the compm~y cope with employees’ disappointment
and disillusion when the company has a bad year and there
are no profits to share ? Should all the profit surplus be
distributed, or some held back in reserve for bad years?
"Should the company bind itself in advance to the payment
of an agreed proportion of profits every year ?
"On what basis should the distribution be made ? Should it be
related to remuneration, length of service or a combination
of both ?
"What should an employees entitlement be when he leaves the
compan.y, retires or is dismissed? Will his estate be entitled
to anything if he should die ?
"Who should manage the funds set aside for sharing - board of
trustees~management~trade unions? Is there scope for a joint
management/union initiative ?
"How can we best inform our employees of our proposals told
seek their views at the earliest opportunity ?
"How can we ensure that when we have decided on a scheme, it
is exxglained as clearly and simply as possible and that all those
covered by the scheme have an opportunity to discuss it with
senior management ?"
We emphasize that these questions represent only management’s thinking; regard
must be had also to the viewpoints of employees of particular industries and of
trade unions, and to society generally if government is tO be involved.
acquire shares in their company.
approved by the ]hlm]d Revenue.
The 1978 U.K. Finance Act purports to make it easier for emplgyees to
Relief from income tax is provided for schemes
From the viewpoint of the company, amounts expended
on :PS are deductible for calculation of corporation profit tax. Conditions were:
administration by trustees resident in UK, at least five years employee service,
participants to be treated like other shareholders, maximum of untaxed allocation
£500. In the 1980\budget speech the latter was increased to £1,000. To encourage
retention of shares vested, the recipient could not sell these in the first two years
of ownerslfip and income tax was payable on sales less than seven years but at a
decreasing rate in years 3-7 after acquisition. In the IDS international report
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(1980), where much of the information in this paragraph and in what follows was
obtained, it is stated that profit sharing in UK has but a small role in "companies’
employment participation policies". There are few schemes in heavy industry or in
highly unionized companies. It is stated that British trade unions "have shown little
enthusiasm for profit sharing, being more interested in increasing their members’
h~fluenced and pay in other ways."
In August 1980 firms with PS schemes approved by the Ilfland Revenue
numbered i51, with 114 awaiting approval. Only two per cent of British workers
are in PS schemes.
The CBI booldet gives a few examples of PS in the UK. In ICI the
scheme is administered by the company through trustees. Under new proposals
four employee trustees will be elected by the stMf. Shares in the compmly are
issued to PS participants in the July of the year following the particular year of
PS allotment. There is no accumulation of shares in the trust from year to year.
The formula for allocation is based on the ratio.
R = Value added/Employee remuneration, (Note that R is largely
unaffected by inflation). R is converted to a percentage of income (7 per cent in the
following example) by a ready reckoner:-
Salary £4, 000, rate 7 per cent = £280
£280 less tax at say 34 per cent = £185
’ £185/share issue price of say £3.90 = 47 shares.
This manner of calculation has the virtue of simplicity, the desirability
for which is emphasized. While shares cm~ easily be sold, it is Stated that, when
least culculated in 1971, about 40 per cent of employee shares /,ere retained.
The Boots Company scheme is about 20 years old. Its declared aim
is to give .employees a share in the company’s prosperity.
as 8½. per cent of UK trading profit (calculated before PS).
The PS ftmd is calculated
Members of UK
1.8
°.
staff who Imve completcd twelve months’ service or more qualify for a share
in the fund. It is for the company to decide whether an individual qualifies
(absenteeism etc). Staff of 49,500 shared £7.3 mi]iion in 1977. Each employee
entitled to a bonus will be allotted a number of shares in the fund equal to the
amount of his weekly pay, with multipliers for 10, 20, 25 and 30 years’ service,
An example is given illustrating how each share is valued: if the mmual fund was
£1,000,000 and total number of shares 513,000 the value of each share would be
£1.95. Again the simplicity of the scheme will be noted.
The H.P. Buhaer Group’s plan is administered by six trustees,
of whom two are employees. Each employee is allotted shares as a percentage of
earnings. Again allotment depends on the ratio I{, e.g. being 1.15 per cent of
pay when R = I. 50 rising to 2.40 per cent when R = I. 75. Trustees hold shares
for five years after which they are vested in the individual employee if he is still
in the company. There is mention of a criticism: during this delay in vesting
the employee "feels very little sense of being a shareholder".
Row-ntree h<[ackintosh has had a PS scheme since 1923. Latterly,
however, the emphases seems to have been more on SAYE (Save as You Earn).
The scheme is stated to offer a large number of employees the opporttmity to
acquire ordinary shares in the comp.’my. According to Option A of the scheme,
employees can have savings (between £1 and £5 a week) deducted from pay, the
money being held for five years and then used to buy shares in the company, paying
the price of those shares fixed five years earlier. (The latter proviso is interesting
in protecting the employee from the risk of a fall in share price and if share price
has risen in the five years, as will ordinarily be the case with a successful company,
g:canting more shares than [f price at vesting were used. ) An interesting feature
is that at the end of the five years the employee has a half-year to decide whether
to buy shares (minhnum 25) or to withdraw Savings which are index-linked mid
carry a bonus. This description has been given at some length for this company
because SAYE has features in common with PS.
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In 1974 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany adopted
a plan that undertakings with an almual profit, before t,q:x, of DM400, 000 (limited
liability companies) and DM 500,000 (private cornpanies) would have to transfer
some equity capital or cash (in some cases) to a clearing institute which distributes
the resources to specially created funds from which all employees and self-employed
persons whose income does not exceed a certain limit will receive participation
certificates which may not be sold for seven years. This draft law has not been
implemented because of some practical difficulties but the principle of employee
participation in company profits has been accepted and denattonalisatton of part
of the Federal industrial property resulted in a distribution of shares to workers,
principally in Volkswagen and :Preussiehe Bergmarks m~d Hutten A6. By legislation
in 1967, income tax is not payable, up to a stated maximum, by workers owning
shares in the eompmly which employs them. There are some provisos including
the holding of the shares for five years before sale.
In West Germm]y voluntary PS schemes are rare (and there is no
legislation making PS compulsory), some major companies use other means
towards the same end. They have arrangements which enable their employees
to acquire shares in the company or other forms of investment, with fiscal incentives.
in 1..976 about 770 firms had arrangements for 800,000 workers to
acquire a stake’in their company, and these firms included the ten largest compmlies
in the country. The usual procedure is for shares to be made available at discount
rates to employees with service qualifications.
very small:
Shareholding of workers is still
Frmlce is exceptional in that, since 1967, PS is required by law in
private sector companies with more than 100 employees and, in spite of a lack
of trade union interest, many smaller companies have volm]tarily introduced a PS
scheme. At the end of 1978, nearly 5,000,000 employees in 11,500 companies
had PS, a quarter of these with less than 100 employees and hence not bound by
i
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law. France has a "complex array" of legislation to put a greater proportion of
industrial capital into the hands of French workers but so far with little success
~a(12~9~ the law’). It would seem as almost in de speration tile Minister of Labour
in 1978 proposed an obligatory handout of shares to employees equivalent to three
per cent of ’the capital of publicly-owned companies, envisaging that eventually
"employees would own between 20 and 30 per cent of the capital of the companies in
which they world’. Not surprisingly one learns that the proposal has had modifications
during the past two years. A bill based on it is at present (September 1980) before
file French parliament but advocating only voluntary share distribution. There is
a second bill making changes in the 1967 I~S law. In our source of information it is
stated that the fate of these bills is uncertain.
:PS in France - cash or shares - is designed for the individual
employee and not for a collective fund. lal 1976, the last year for which statistics
are available, average allocation under the law was £110 but there were wide
variations amongst industries, ranging from £320 in the petroleum industry to
¯ about £60 in construction. About a fifth of beneficartes got more than 5 per cent
of ammal pay and a quarter got less than one per cent. :Presumably because of
the statutory formtila (consideration of which follows) nearly two million employees
in companies with :ps schemes got nothing.
The formula used in France to define a firm’s contribu(:ion to the
workers’ Spec[al :Participation Fund (SPF) is as follows:-
S:PF = (lB -. 05C) S/2 VA
where B =.profit less tax, C = capital applied, S = employee compensation, VA =
value added, to which we may add N = number of employees. One can see most
of the rationale of the formula; no payment unless profit after tax exceeds 5 per
cent of capital and, once again, the ratio S/VA bvhich we have noted in UK schemes).
The fraction ½-may imply an equal division of this surplus between o~aers and
employees. An authority states that an object Of the formula is to "cushion the
difference" between capital mid labour intensive industries. To examine this point
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theoretically let us convert the formula into rates by the following substitution:
Profit before tax = kB, k 1
VA = kB + S
S = wN
B=bc
C=aN
The lower case letters are the rates. There is no a priori reason why k, w, b
should necessarily vary with size of firm or capital intensity, measured by a.
substitution in the formula - SPF/N = a (b -. 05) w/2 (%ba + w) = f, say.
On
The coefficient a directly measures capital-intensity, so we may
calculate f, the firm’s contribution per employee for different values of a, giving
the other coefficients reasonable constant values. As examples with w (asnumera, re)f .
= 1, k = 1.5 and b = 0.8 we find f = . 0882 for a = 20 and f = .1188 for a = 100, which
means that at these capital intensities the firm’s payments to the workers’ SPF
would be 8.82 and 11.88 per cent respectively of pay. The formula can be regarded
as "cushioning" for it succeeds in this example in making a contribution ratio of
1.35 (= 11.88/8.82) while the capital ratio was 5. The range in actual payments
per employee between industries quoted above are certainly not in accord with this
statutory formula which could, of course, mem~ that some industries are more
generous than the law requires and/or the fact that firms with less than 100 employees
with l°S are not statutarily bound. This may account for the low average payment
of £60 in the construction industry.
A survey of industries in the Netherlands in 1976 covering 40,000
companies withten or more employees, 2.8 million in all showed that 7,000
companies (one-sixth of all) had loS. Schemes were more common amongst larger
companies; one-fifth of those with 100 or more employees had loS. 4,000 firms
had a scheme covering all employees, most of the remaining schemes extending
only to senior employees. Some 600,000 employees participated in 1976 and 90
per cent of these received some payment in that year. In companies covering all
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employees payment per employee was about £290 and average payment was £750
in companies with schemes for part of staff. Most important manner of payment
was a fixed percentage of employee’s pay. About half of the PS schemes are
included in conditions of employment but it is stated that Dutch collective agreements
seem to have had only a small part in establishing schemes. Most allocations were
based on companies’ published profit figures, the rest on tamable profits, dividends,
turnover or output. Legislation facilitating company savings schemes has been
in force since the 1960s. In 1978 two bills were introduced in the Dutch parliament
which would require companies to distribute up to 24 per cent of "excess" profits
to employees, i.e. in excess of a certain amotmt each year - £26,000 in 1980 to
be indexed in future. A maxhnum is proposed equivalent to three per cent of the
company’s taxable profit. The principle is the participation of employees in the
capital growth of companies - it is known as VAD. Some of the allocations would
go to individual employees, some to a national fund for all Dutch workers with
trade union representatives with a majority on the board. This is known as the
collective VAD scheme. In principle all payments would be in the form of shares
or other asset certificates. There seems little point in describing the schemes in
detail since they are controversial with many amendments proposed already, so
that the final form is uncertain.
I
The Meidner plan in Sweden (initiated in 1971) rejected individual PS,
because of the objection of tying the wage earner to the firm and promotes
solidarity amongst workpeople and employers instead of amongst workpeople alone.
The plan envisaged companies being required by law to use some 20 per cent of
their pretax profit annually in the form of new shares. These would go to a "central
equalisation fund" to be rim by the trade unions. The object would be for the fund to
acquire shares which would entitle it to appoint delegates as directors of companies.
The Swedish blue-collar union federation LO gave formal support to the plan in 1976.
The plmx naturally created great political controversy and it is believed that it
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was partly the cause of the fall of the Social Democratic (SAP) government in
1976 after 40 years’ rule. In 1978 ajoint LO-SAP working party proposed
changing obligatory PS rules to voluntary and the 1978 SAP congress postponed
party decision on employee funds to 1981. There is also a Meyr commission
appointed by the govermnent in 1975 to examine the whole question of employee
funds and due to report in December 1980.
Danish unions were amongst the first in Europe to claim a greater
share in the ownership of industry through a collective fund. The Danish LO’s
proposals formed the basis for a draft law introduced by the Social Democratic
government in 1973 but the government fell that year. Vv~nile unions persist in
central fund proposals, employers oppose but they favour voluntary financial
participation by employees in their companies. According to Danish trade union
ideas the employee - holding would be frozen for seven years in the fund after
which fl~e employee would receive payment in cash.
There are already voluntary schemes in Denmark.
arrangement is for the employee to acquire shares at a favourable
can also be a transfer of profit;
at the end of 1978.
Usually the
rate; there
99 companies with 85,000 employees were involved
In Ireland, a discussion Paper on Worker Participation (which includes
financial participation) was issued in 1980 with the aim of "focusing debate on the
key issues", tO promote discussion and to encourage initiatives.
The section on financial participation argues that recognition be
given to empl6yees’, in respect of their interests in and contribution to the wealth
ci-eated by theh- labour." Financial participation could also influence the level of
inflation and the supply of investment capital, while in its social dhnension "it is
a logical development of workers demmlds for broader-based participation in the
operations of the enterprise. " When workers are asked to practice wage demands
restraints it is "only just and equitable that they should be entitled to share in the
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wealth thus created when the subsequent recovery in economic performance takes
place".
Financial participation must be developed through good mm~agement
and trade union practice "as part of a total pattern and philosophy of employee
participation",
In the next section we give the results of a sample survey in Ireland.
In the US profit sharing has grown, perhaps more than in European
countries; this may be, in part, due to the fact that schemes are used to provide
superannuation schemes and other fringe benefits. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 is stated to have had a profotmd effect on promoting PS in USA.
Tax~ deductabilty has played a large part. Usually profit sharing schemes are
envisaged as (i) a means of attracting and retaining quality persolmel; (ii) the
creation of incentives; (iii) the deferment of current income taxes and accumulation
of a capital reserve, (iv) maximisation of accumulation of capital through the exemption
trusts; (v) the provision of retirement income and of benefits in respect of sickness,
death, disability; (vi) fulfilling the company’s social responsibility and enhancing
The most usual schemes for profit sharing are, cash only, deferred
shares, a combination of both, and savings and thrift plans. Profit sharing is
regarded as an organisational incentive designed to unite employees with the company
in the common goal of profitability m~d efficiency. Its objective is the promotion.of
unity of prupose and equitable sharing within the enterprise.
Bert L. h<[etzger (1980) states that:
"Profit sharing should not be used as a substitute for -
¯     competitive wages and customary fringe benefits;
¯     good working conditions;
its image¯
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sound personnel practices (e. g. fair wage and salary
administration, equitable treatment of employees, grievance
resolution, training and development, promotion from within,
and the like);
competent management (profit sharing will not generate a
profit when management, even in normal times, cannot)".
A US writer using US data states
"On all measures of significance, the profit-sharing
sharing group of companies outperformed the non-profit-sharing
group by substantial and widening percentages as can be seen in
the foil.owing table:
Ratio,s~ 1969
Net income to net worth
Net income to sales
Profit-sharing Non-Profit-
Companies sharing
Companies
12.78% 8.00%
3.62% 2.70%
Indices, 1969 (1952 = i00)
Sales
Net worth
Earnings per common share
Dividends per common share
Market price per common share
358.40 266.00
376.10 256.70
410.50 218.80
293.70 175.30
f
782.10 397.60
Other Measures
Approximate company earnings per
employee (1969) $1,165 $647
Growth of the invested dollar
(1952-1969) , $9.89 $5.61
Employment growth 103, 7 % 75.5%"
The data related to US department store chains. Our comment is
that the trouble here is attribution of causation. While the introductory wording
of the foregoing quotation is careful, there is an implication and ml intention to
convey the impression that PS was the reason for the different experience of the
two groups. It may be that it was because they were successful that the PS group
had recourse to PS; there seems no justification for the adjective "widening" in
the quotation. If more successful than the non - PS group in the period 1952-69,
it is likely to have been mpre successful prior to 1952 and, when it was decided
to adopt PS, the future prospect of the group must have seemed favourable. Our
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reading leads us towards the latter direction of causation, i. e’ towards a discounting
of incentive effects of PS.
/"
PS has had a great success in U.S.A. John Fitzpatrick (1978)
w~i te s: -
"The present strength of the movement may be gauged by
reference to its membership. Some ten million employees
are now covered and the trust funds accumulated on their
behalf amount to over $30 billion. One in every four
mm~ufacturing, one in three distribution businesses, now
operate profit-sharing schenqes. Forty percent of America’s
four thousand banks, including three-quarters of the largest,
have schemes. Sectors hitherto considered unsuitable for profit-
sharing, such for instance as construction and transportation,
have been found susceptible. Irrespective of whether the Company’s
operation is labour-intensive or otherwise, or whether profits
are stable or widcly fluctuating, it has been found possible to
devise effective schemes. "
As regards USA’s greater recourse to PS it may be observed
that, as regards pensions and social security,, at company level and governmentally,
USA has been backward compared to Europe. PS is tax-favoured in USA yet this
alone cannot account for its success which must be due in part to PS’s incentive
mid related effects.
2. Some Statistical Aspects of Profit in Ireland
:For a consideration of PS we should know something about profit
levels in Ireland, in regard to which statistics are meagre. Our short analysis
may have some interest in itself.
Table 2.1 shows that between 1960 (about when the modern industrial
revolution started) and 1978 (latest figures available, in preliminary form ) the
proportions borne by pay of employees and "other" income (the latter so termed
in what follows) in added value has changed drastically; in fact percentage of
other income fell from 42.5 to 32.1, the very 10w figures for 1974:-76 reflecting
the recession in these years, reminding us the essential character of other
income, namely that it is a residue, showing the effects of the vicissitudes
of fortune in factors external to enterprise. Of course, other income includes
more than profit in the narrow sense (i. e. as interest on capital) since it
includes incomes of the self-employed.
From the PS point of view, interest must centre on major sector 3
of Table 2.1. We notice that, in current terms, with 1960 as 100, other income
in 1978 was 900 while employee pay was about 1,200, prices (last row of table)
multiplying by six. The row of percentages for this major sector (3) show
that the stable situation of the years 1970-73 was restored in 1977.
The great fall in the percentage borne by employee compensation in
AFF from 12.9 in 1960 to 6.4 in 1978 is due to tim decline in number of
employees in AFF which, as a value judo-ment, we deplore.
Table 2. I.
# 4 ~,                                                                                                         ,,
¯ ?
Added value in categories (I) remuneration of employees, (2) other income in three major sectors 1960-1977, with ~ercentages derived therehom, with personal
expenditure price indexes                                            Values in £ million
Major sector 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976      " 1977 1978
I..
l
Agriculture, forestry, fishing (AFF)
Remuneration of employees
Other Income
2. Public administration, defence (PAD)
3. Other domestic sectors (ODS)
Remuneration of employees
Other Income
17.2 - 20.5 26.0 28.6 31’0 33.6 38.1 45.4 50.9 . 54.8 59
116.2 146.2 188.3 208.0 293.0 374.0 342.1 489.7 552.6 761.9 865
30.5 49.9 84.2 96.2 116.7 142.6 168.5 241.3 282.2 310.5 362
246.1 403.9 734,6
100.9 141.3 216.6
854.3 989.9 1,200.8 1,451.6 1,836.1 175.7 2,561.0 3,009
238.7 292.7 337.2 318.5 376.2 493.2 680.1 908
4. Net domestic product at factor cost
(NDP)
Rein uneradon o f employees.
Other Income
510.9 761. 8
293.8 474. 3
217. I 287. 5
]~249.7 1, 425.8 1,723.3 2, 088.2 2,318.8 2,988.7 3,554.6 4,368.1 5,203
844.8 979.1 I, 137. 6 1,377.0 1,658.2 2,122.8 2,508.8 2,926.1 3.430
404.9 446.7 585.7 711.2 660.6 865.9 1,045.8 1,442.0 1,773
I. Agriculture, forestry, fishing
3. Other domestic sectors (ex PAD)
¯ 4. Net domestic product (incl. PAD)
87. I 87.7
29. 1 25.9
42.5 37.7
Otherincome as percentage oftotal
87.9        87.9        90.4       91.8        91.5       91.5       91.6 93.3
22.8 21.8 22.8 21.9 18.0 17.0 18.5 21.0
32.4 31.3 35.0 34.1 28.5 29.0 29.4 33.0
93.6
23.2
34. 1
Derived personal expenditure price
index (1975 as I00) 23. 4 40.5 52.8 57.7 63.3 70.6 81.8 , 100 119.2 133.7 143.4
Basic source: NIE 1977, Tables A2 and B2, NIE 1978
Table 2.2 shows tl]e fluctuation in price of ordinary stocks and shares o~
Irish companies quoted oa the Irish Stock Exchange. These are the prices of a
weighted set of quotations which would Imve cost £100 on average in 1963. Annual
averages are those of the prices at the beginning of each month. The trend is
#
illustrated on Chart 1, which also shows the CPI to the same base (1963). The
fluctuations in price from year to year in the share price index are seen to be
very large, remarkably so, considering that these figures are averaged two
t
ways, by individual quotations and by months. We surmise that the rewards
by way of capital gains of investors in individual Irish stocks are very variable.
Since 1963 the prices of stocks and shares have barely kept pace with
tile CPI, while reflecting the recession of 1974-76. In view of tile risk of
investment the investor might have expected better. This experience is in
strong contrast to tile period 1960-63, the early years of tile industrial resurgence,
t
when obviously on investor buyi,lg in 1960 and selling in 1963 would have
profited handsomely in real terms.
~Chart 1]
Table 2.3 has for its object the comparison of the last two rows (5, 6):
I
while real earnings per hour of employees have doubled between 1960 and 1973,
real profit per £100 constant price capital has remained almost static. Vaughan’s
estimates of fixed capital extend only to the year 1973 and all constant price data
relate to the year 1958, as is the case with the capital estimates. In manufacturing
industry the reward of labour has improved enormously, no doubt mainly througll
greatly increased capitalisation, the ulfitary remuneration of which however, has
not increased over the period 1960-73.
2.4
T_~bl_J_~.,.2_9, Price index numbers of Irish ordinary stocks and shares and of consumer prices 1960-1979~
. 1963 as I00
Ir. ord.
Year Stocks & CPI
Shares
19 60 60.4 91. 1
1961 71. 6 93. 6
1962 82.0 97.6
1963 100 100
1964 124. 6 106. 7
1965 121.0 112, 1
1966 112.9 115, 4
1967 112.7 1191 1
1968 160, 7 124.7
1969 169.9 134, 0
Year CPI
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
It. ord.
Stocks &
Shares
149. 5
145.0
913. 3
252.0
169. 3
164. 6
174. 6
219.2
331.9
¯ $
370, 7
145.0
157.9
171.6
191. 1
223.5
270.2
318. 8
36"2.3
390.0
441.9
7 months
Basic sources: various issues of Irish Statistical Bullctin~
"1
g’
g
I’
I’ I.
"
i i, l ! i "i l" . I I i ! l
Table 2. 3. Real earnings per hour and real profit per £1, 000 fn<ed capital invested manufacturing industry, 1960-1973
Item 1960 !965 1970 1971 1972 1973
I~ Fixed capitallat constant (1958) prices, net (F_m) 185. i 269. 7 404. I
2. Pro~t at current prices - (F_m) 88.3 54.8 100.2
3. Pro~t at constant (1958) :,. (Y,m) 38. 1 44. 4 62.7
4. Earnings per hour, current, September (£) O. 167 O. 245 O. 424~
5. Earnings per hour at constant (1958) prices (£) O. !67 O. 198 O. 263
6. P~o~t at constant pdces per £I00 net capital at constant prices (£) 20. 6 16. 5 15.5
440.0 ’
II0. 0
63.2
O. 491
O. 28O
14.4
494. ,5
154. 2
81.6
0.559
0.293
16.5
535.6
197.3
93.7
O. 687
0.323
17.5
Basic source~.
Item
I.
2.
3o
5.
6.
"Estimates of Capital Employed in Manufacturing Indus,17 1950-1973" by R. Vaughan ESRI Paper No.
Statistical Bulletin (various issues).
Notes
¯ . ." . o
Vaughan’s estimams are calcuIated by the perpetual inventory method, based mainly on the CIP values of gross ~xed capital formation.
E.W. Henry’s input-output estimate for pro~t in manufacturing industry in 1976 adjusted proportionately according to value added other than empioyed income
in all industry (Table 2A and 2B in NIE 1977).
2 deflated by annual CPI.
4 deflated by mid-August CPI.
Quotient x 100 of 3 by 1.
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An examination of the financial returns of Irish companies brings to light
the extraordinary variability in profit return between companies. We envisage
the single year 1979 and in Table 2.4 we consider the resul~ of investing £100 at the
beginning of the year and selling it at the end. The dividend is not that for the
calendar year 1979 but that which (if any) is the latest paid. The data used are
those compiled by E. McVey for The Irish Times, in which companies are ranked
according to turnover, no. 1 the highest. Table 2 ,4 shows net dividend, capital gain
realised and the sum of the two which we term "return" (on the £100 invested, not
to be confused with company profit, analysed later).
Table 2.4]
The number of companies listed is 61. The simple averages of net
dividend, capital gain and return on the £100 invested were respectively £6.06,
£0.08 and £6.14. Ten companies (or one sixth) paid no dividend, 31 (or just one
half) made capital losses. Since capital gains (or losses) were greater in absolute
magnitude than net dividends, the picture for returns was similar to that for capital
gains; losses occurred in 27 companies. The highest net dividend was £24
(for company no. 60), capital gains (or losses) ranged from £59 (for company no. 47)
to minus £51 (for company no. 46), all in relation to the same investment of
£100. Table 2.5 gives the frequency distribution according to the three factors.
Table 2.5
Net No.
dividend (£)
0 10
0.01 -3.99
-
7
4 - 7.99 24
8 - 1F.99, 17
12 or over 3
No. of companies 61
Frequency distributions based on Table 2.4
Capital No. Return
gain (£) No.
30 or over 10 12
0 - 29.99 20 22
-30 - -0.01 23 21
-30.01 or less 8 6
61 61
Same classification as for capital gain.
Table 2. 4. Return on £100 invested in each Irish company at the beginning, and sold at the end, of 1979. Data in £
Rank Net dividend Capital
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
Returrl
4.46 -20. 92 -16.46
3. 93 -II. 22 - 7.29
4. 93 -20.54 -15.61
8. 66 15.46 24. 12
7. 65 2. 94 I0.59
6. 87 5. 00 II. 87
3.20 -14. 14 -10.94
0 -39. 71 -39.71
3.71 -14.29
-I0. 58
11.27 3.23 14. 50
4. 88 -20.98 -16. I0
6. 36 "1. 73 4. 63
3.78 -4.05 -0.27
7. 14 -17. 86 -10.72
8. 35 12. q8 21. 13
5. O0 -35. 19 "30.19
I0. O0 -4. 62 5.38
5.58 II. 63 17.21
7.52 27. 82 35.34
0 -I0. O0 -I0. O0
Rank Net dividend Capital
No. gain
21
22-
23
24
Return
5.78 1.05 6. 83
8. 20 -34. O0 -25.80
8.72 -10.26 - 1.54
9.71 5.91 15.62
Rank Net dividend
No.
41 5.13
42 5.30
43 12.9 6
44 0
45 0
46 0
47 I. 41
48 11.96
49 5.12
51 4.38
52 I0.29
53 4.58
54 II. 72
55 8.33
56 0
57 4.11
58 0
59 0
60 23.86
61 2.50
+ 6. 60
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
8.71 57.41 66.12
5. 95 -29.52 -23.57
8. 33 3.33 II. 66
II. 67 -I. 67 I0.00
4. 12 87. 36 41.48
6.05 "33.33 -28.28
9.52 20.29 29.81
8.33 0 8. 33
4.45 17.50 21.95
6. 09 O. 78 6. 87
I0. 32 31.58 41, 90
0 27.27 27.27
7.02 6. 67 13.69
12.50 37.50 50. O0
0 42.86 42.86
3.96 -15.09 -11.13
Capital
gain
-7. 69
-9.72
-7.41
-3.85
-48. 15
-51.43
58.82
30.43
-19.51
-35. O0
23.53
-14.29
-21.88
50.00
-5.00
9.20
-10. O0
-38. 60
36.36
0
39,62
Return
-2.56
-4. 42
5.55
-3.85
-48. 15
-51.43
60.23 "
42.39
-14.39
-30. 62
33.82
-9.71
-I0.16
58.33
-5.00
13.31
-i0.00
-38. 60
60.22
2. 50
46.22
* +
ParticuIars missing for company ranked no. 50    Turnover, hence rank, unknown.
Basic source: Table compiled by Eoin McVey in The Irish Times 29 December 1979.
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a
Table 2.6 is based on the 59 of the 61 Irtsl.~ companies displayed [n
Table 2.4 for which particulars of employment, capital aTld profit were available
from the M:oVey table. In aggregate in the 59 firms, capital, employed amounted
to £674 million, profit £125 million, number of employees 75,400. It will be noted
J
that the principle of classification by size,namely turnover, is different, for the
three factors manipulated, a procedure necessary for avoidance of bias. The
average number of employees column shows that the turnover classification also
Is successful in classifying by size of company as measured by number of employees.
Assignment of about equal numbers of companies in each grade in Table 2.6
deliberate, to avoid selectivity.
While the figures in the last two columns do not vary regularly with
size of firm it is fairly clear thatcapitalintensity (last column) is related to size
of firm.
There are many definitions of capital. To assume that any of the
capital~as defined and measured for Table 2.6, would be available for alternative
investment is fanciful. Nevertheless, a very strong impression from Table 2.6 is
that percentage profit is far too low, in view of the demonstrated risk attached to
mvestment.m Irish securities, which are anything but secure. The aggregate 18.6%
is but little in excess of the approximate 16½-% yield on longterm Irish Government
stock in 1979, available without any hazard whatsoever, apart, of course, from
capital or ilfflationary loss.
It may be because of emphasis on employment in the Irish economic
upsurge that profitability of investment has been disregarded, .due in large measure
to the ab~el~ce of official statistics of capital:employed. Yet in the private sector
investment depends on anticipation of profit and investment is needed for employment.
If no firm statement can be ~nade about the rewards in equity of labour and capital
in the divislo,1 of value added, we have shown that treudwise labour has fared better
Table 2.6
2.10
Number of employees per company, profit as a percentage of capttal and capital
per employee in five groups of companies classified by turnover, 1979
Ralak Nos. No. of cos. Employees per company Profit as Capital employed
o]o of. per employee
capital
No. qo ¯ £
1 " 12 12 3, 649 19. 8 9, 970
18 " 24 12 2,363 15. 1 7,538
25 " 36 11 827 21.0 7, 675
37 " 48 12 458 14. 1 ’/, 486
49 " 61 13 163 11.8 6, 992
All cos. 59 1, 279 18. 6 8, 932
Basic source: Same as Table 4
Not..__~e
Capital employed is tile sum of the issued share...capita~reserves, loans, net bank overdraft,
minority interests and future tax less goodwill, Profit is before interest and tax.
.,.+
2.11
than capital and, having regard to the risks associated with private investment,
¯ earnings therein seem meagre.
One of the stated objects of PS is the wider dJ.ssemination of
ownership of wealth. So there is some interest in its present concentration in
Irish business. Table 2.7 shows that of £674m. capital £119m. or 18 per cent
Table 2.7]
is owned by company directors or members of their families. As might be
expected family--d[reetor ownership percentage diminishes as company size
increases. Oats[de ownership percentage, 31 per cent overall, varies generally,
if not regularly, with size of company. While, as pointed out in tlm Note, the two
categories are not exclusive, it seems that about half the capital is owned in
Ireland other than by directors and family and that the proportion (one-half)
does not vary much by size of company. In Tables 2.6 and 2.7 the classification
of companies is the same. The showing in both is dominated by the twelve companies
in the largest group which accounts for two-thirds of capital employed and nearly
two-fifths of employment.
¯ Table 2.4 -2.7 relate only to what are described as "Irish public
companies" ,which those for which prices are quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange.
Their activities cover only a small fraction of all Irish business, best evidenced
by their employing 75,000 only 10 (7) per cent of all non-agricultural employees
in the State.
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Table 2.7. Total capital employed, capital owned by family and directors, and capital
owned outside the State, in same five groups of companies as in Table 2.6
Rank ]No. of Capital Ownership
nos. cos. employed Fam. dir. Outside
. % Ownership
Faro. dir. Outside
£ m £ In £ m
1-12 12 436,6 59.81 163.15 13.7 37.4
13-14 11 113.0 23.05 15.82 20.4 14.0
25-36 11 69.3 17.50 15.64 25.3 22.6
37-48 12 40.7 14.03 10.10 34.5 24.8
49-61 13 14.2 4.79 2.44 33.7 17.2
All cos. 59 673.8 119.18 207.15 17.7 30.7
Basic source: Same as Table 2.4
Note
Capital as defined for Table 3.6. Amounts in the two categories of
ownership in each size group estimated by applying given percentages to capital
employed. The two categories are not exclusive since it is obvious from the
individual records that some family-director mmmrs reside outside the State.
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Correlation coefficients between the variables c]eait with in the
foregoing analyses are as follows
1 2 3 4 5
1 No. employees 1 -. 15 .13 -. 07 -. 20
% equity held by -
2 Faro., directors -. 15 1 -. 36 .23 .16
3 Outside State .13 -. 36 1 -. 11 .-. 02
Per £100 invested-
4 Net dividend -. 07 .22 -. 11 1 .39
5 Capital gain .20 .16 -.02 .39 1
For c.c. NH]? critical levels for 57 d.f. : - r (.1) = .22; r(.05)=.26; r (.01)=.33
All correlations are small. Only two cm~ be accounted significant
mid both are to be expected, the . 39 between dividend (4) ,and capital gain (5)
and the negative -.36 between percentages (2, 3). There seems to be a slight
tendency for businesses with high ownership by family and directors to have
higher dividends and capital gains.
One set of non-significant results is of greater interest, namely
fllat size of business as determined by employment (1) had no i~ffluence on the
other variables. The tables given earlier were more revealing than this
correlation analysis.
3. Irish experience with profit sharin~
"Company" is a vague concept in its popular usage in Ireland.
From different sources we derived a list of about 3,000 companies, from
which we selected a non-random sample of about one-tenth, in fact 319, to
whom a very simple single page form containing six questions was sent; 180
or 56 per cent were returned. We are aware that PS in Ireland is at its
small beginnings so that the object of our inquiry was more to obtain details
of types of PS as case histories than as statistical estimates (of number of
companies practising PS classified in various ways); enough to lmow that some
one-tenth or fewer of companies have some form of PS. Hence the non-random
sample which, in fact, consisted of (i) all Irish companies in the 1979 Iris_.__h
Times list, ([i) all banks and finance houses listed in Thorn’s Commercial
Directory 1979/80, (iii) a one-tenth systematic sample of companies listed
in Thom’s Commercial Directory 1979/80, (iv) a one-third sample of the top 100
grant-aided foreign companies, to repeat 319 companies in all.
Of 180 which responded, 30 had PS in some form, or one-sixth.
Probably the national proportion is much smaller (even as regards companies)
since one assumes that the 139 who did not trouble to reply contained very few
profit sharers. Suffice to repeat that PS is at its small beginnings in Ireland.
The 30 were interviewed orally using a very detailed structured form - see
synoptic table - or were sent the form; 22 companies complied. It may be
stated, without specifically identifying them, that they contain a number of
the most illustrious companies in Ireland. Our object is not to obtain statistics
of the number of companies practising PS in Ireland, (we knew beforehand that
they were few) classified in various ways, but rather to ascertain the types of profit-
sharingwhich, as it happens, vary a great deal. We have tried to show these
variations in the synoptic table but there are many particularities which the
table conceals. For this reason we have judged it expedient to give a short
description for each of the twenty-two companies, as an Appendix.
 s optio taUle with
Co. No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
411
Synoptic table showing profit-sharlng characteristics of twenty-two Irish companies, (See Key for numer~tlon)
8 9 10    11     12     13     14     15     16     17 18 19     20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
CO.
30 :No. 31    32     33
1 i!i 25 3    8,000 I iv 7,300 ii I l i Ii .iil iii i f ti
$
2 iii 100 15     ~60 ii iv    160 t, iit t t i il t t i t i
3 tl 1 6 230 ii t 30 i - - - ii i i i
ti it, iii, tv i tt 73/74 i if
i[ if, iv . i ii 65/66 i ii
i - - - ~3 i --
i iii" f, li, iit, 1 U- i 1, li
I itt, ty, I, Ill, v, 2 v t ~ iI, iv
vii
- t i, ii, iIi 3 v i i
4 "t, it "39 5 115 ti i 12 i, lI If - " t it if[ - i - it’ t II it [ - 78/79    i ii i i iii, v 4    v i i
5 lil - - 7, 500 i iv 7,500 i, iil i i i II iii ill- [ i
6 ili I00 I 200 li iv 90 i,H’~ i i il " - ili Ill i i
7 iii 16 4 600 "t i 32 i, iii i If li fi i li i i
8 f 75 4 2,500 if iV 2,500 i ii - ii i if - - i
il t 1[ I
if i i i
ii i . i ii
Ii i t i
ii ii, iii i ii ’50 i . i, ii
[ - i it ’74 i iI
ii i~ti, ili i It ’78 ’i it
iv
it ii - - ’64 i - i[
iiit, iv it, v 5 v t t, it. it[
i i[I i,ii, iii, 6 i [ 4 Iit, v’di
vH
i iii, tv i, ii, iit, 7 v i i, iii, vi
V V, Vi
- iii, v t, ii, iii 8 v f 1, II. iif, iv, viii
9 [ I00 - 323 il iv 323 i Ii - li i I - - ii Ii    i
1O ill I00 2,700 i iv 2, 700 i ii - iI
Ii I     51 I0 217 l[ i 12 i ii - i lii ill - - i li    i
i    il ii il - - ’79 i f - ii, iv I, ii, iI~ 9 ii i L ii, lil, vltl
V
ii - - i It iv, v i, H, iii I0 Iii i ~v~
i    il ii ~ [l - - ’79 i iI - i iH I1 :.    v i i, ii
12 i,l[ 5" - .11800 i iv 400 Ii II i ii li - ill i "- It
13 lii I00 6 90 i iv     70 I, lil Ii il II ii ii[ Ill i i li
-     ii Ii II    ii i- II ’79 i    ii I ill, IV I, il, IH, 12 I1 i i, vi
v, vii
i, ll i i ii    iI i II ’78 i ii [ iii i,v 13 iii i i, if, ill
14 i, il 51 -     900 I i 40 ill i If li li i ii i [ II     - "- i     II " [, iv     I li ’75    i ii     i iii viii     14    v i 1, iI, ill
15 I    5 2    600 ~ iv 550 il ii li - li ill i i Ii H il ii [    ii I     i ii ’71 i il    i ill if 15 Iii    I     4il
16    i 0 - 350 i    i 40 { II -    i! iI lii - - i    II     i      [    i ii    il - -    ’76    i    li -    Ill    iil, vli 16     i i i, il
17 lii    I00     - 598    [i iv 524    i, il     li if ii iI lii     iiII i ii i i li Ii :li . i ii ’79 i If i ill - 17 - i
18 i, ii    43     I 2,700    i i 170    i ii i i: li ill    li i iii    il ill ii i It i i Ii ’69 i li I i vii 18 il i I, iII, V
19 i I00 3
20 i 35 4½
’21 i I00 9
600 ii iV
863 i iv
482 il iV
593 1 li - it i il i II i i i li "H - - ’25 I ii - ii, ill, il, fibril 19 i i i, it
iv iv
849 i il - ii i li i ii [ il li li i[ - - ’75 i i - ii, ill, i, H,v. 20 v i i, il, [v, vll
iv "
482 i li - li I [ii - -    ii - i ii i ii Ii - - ’67 i "- - i i, li 21 v i i
22 i    25 - 900 i iV 350 Ill i ii il i’~ Ill i i    -    l[     - -    - i    i[ .... ii, iv 1, ii, Ill, 22 i [ ii, ii:, iv, vii’.
iv
3.3
Key to notation in synoptic table
1
2
3
4
5
6
’v
8
9
I0
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Broad sector:- (i) manufacturing, (ii) distribution, (iii) other services
Percentage of equity held outside State
Percentage of after-tax profit distributed under the profit-sharing scheme
in the last financial year. * Percentage before tax
Employment (approximate).
t public (principal), ii public (subsidiary).
Coverage:- i managerial, executive, ii clerical, iii other employees,
iv all employees.
Number of employees in scheme.
Form of sharing:- i cash, ii allocation of stiares, iii share option.
Contribution by employees:- i Yes, ii No
Are shares issued at a discount? i Yes, ii No.
Is scheme varied according to type of employee:- i Yes, ii No.
Are part time staff included? i Yes, ii No
Minimum period of service for qualification:- i no minimum, ii under one
year, iii one year or over.
If shares are allocated, can employees:- i sell shares immediately or
hold for under one year, ii hold one year but under five yeat’s, iii hold
five years or over?
Shares or options issued to:- individual employees, ii a trust fund for
employees.
Frequency of payment:- i yearly, ii twice yearly, iii more frequently.
Employee participation in management of PS:- i Yes, ii No
Allocations:- i before tax, ii after tax, iii unrelated to profit.
Minimum profit necessary before allocation:- i Yes, ii No.
Allocation discretionary:- i Yes, ii No.
Do employees receive equal amounts? i Yes, ii No
If 21 is No, allocations are according to:- i seniority, ii pay, iii grade,
iv merit?
Allocation is of i ordinary shares, ii preference shares.
Negotiation of value of shares wifil employees:- i Yes, ii No.
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
3.4
Year when PS started.
Was PS started on initiative of i management, ii employees,
If 26 was i, were employees consulted before initiation? i Yes, ii No
Is share of share option allocation confined to own shares? i Yes, ii No
Steps taken by management to propagate benefit of PS - i no action,
ii notices on notice boards, iii communications to individuals, iv staff
meetings, v brochures etc.
Company objectives in PS - i distributive justice, ii industrial relations,
iiiproductivity, efficiency, iv lessening absenteeism, v motivation,
vi competitiveness, vii profit, viii retain staff.
Attaimnent of objectives - i no, ii partly, iii doubtful, iv not long enough
in operation to judge, v yes.
Fringe benefits independent of PS - i Yes, ii No.
If Yes at 32, benefits:- i pension, ii medical, iii cash bonus, iv subsidy
to canteen, bar, v car, vi loans, vii product allowance, viii other
Does not apply or not stated.
3.5
The showing of the table may be summarized as follows.
About half the companies arc owned (in majority equity) outside Ireland.
Practically all are large firms by Irish standards. Most of the after - tax
profit for PS is less than 10 per cent. All are public companies, half-and-half
principal and subsidiary. Two-thirds of the companies’ PS extends to all
permanent staff, one-third to the executive class only, in the latte]: case
the proportion of staff covered is therefore small. In most cases distribution
is in the form of cash, sometimes with shares or share-options. Contributions
by employees is rare. In most relevant cases shares are issued to participants
at a discount, and do not vary according to rank of employee. Mostly part-time
staff are not included. A year or more service by recipients for inclusion is
required in most cases. Practice is varied as to length of time shares must
be held unsold. In all cases-of shares but one in the sample, shares were
allocated on an individual (and not a trust fund) basis. Sharing was mostly
yearly. In nearly all cases there was no employee participation in management
of PS, in the initiation of the scheme or any form of consultancy in regard to it;
PS is the child of management in Ireland. Most allocations are before tax;
a minimum profit is necessary before PS, mostly. Allocation is discretionary
in about half the sample companies (i. e. at the discretion of management, half
therefore according to some predetermined rule). Distribution is usually
according to pay. Shares are always ordinary shares in own company, with
no prior negotiation of value with staff by management. In all lo~own cases but
bye schemes was of recent origin (earliest 1964). Some action was taken by
mangement in most cases to propagate benefits of PS amongst employees.
Company objectives ranged over the whole spectrum listed in the Key
(head 30). All sampled companies had fringe benefits, invariably including
pension. As to attainment of objectives, most comp~’mies were satisfied, but
amongst 21 respondents to this head 31 there were four blunt noes.
3.6
Our interviews with the twenty-two PS companies left us with the
following impressions:-
¯ ’ 1 Compmlies were highly successful by the usual tests;
2 their PS was of recent origin;
3 their deep involvement in fringe benefits;
4 non-involvement of staff in initiating or controlling PS schemes;
5 extent to whichPS schemes consisted of cash and not share
allocation, tending to result in PS being regarded as part of
pay and not in sharing in ownership;
6 comparative disinterest as to whether PS would benefit company;
7 small propaganda amongst st,’fff about PS.
It would seem indeed that the impulsion towards PS on these companies
was an extension of 3 above, which could come under the head of enlightened se~-
interest, but with little concern about results. If PS is to be adopted it seems that
reversal at heads 4 - 7 would be beneficial. A very serious qualification to widespread
profit sharing 111 Ireland is our statistical showing that profit as percentage of capital
invested is generally low. Variation is, however, great, so that a proportion of
firms could afford substantial PS.
While, in our sample, a majority indicated that they were satisfied
"F
with the results of PS (and are so recorded in the synoptic table) we suspect that
this is usually a statement that.the system is Working efficiently. For the majority
of companies :PS has been in operation for only a few years and it is too soon to
decide whether the scheme has been a success as regards any or all the desired
effects, as listed at head 30 of the key to the synoptic table. In any case it will
be difficult to decide since the firms which have PS are "good" firms and the might
have been equally successful without PS.
4. Conclusion
From our study of the literature, a survey in Ireland involving personal
interviews on a structured questionnaire with companies practising PS, and from
our own impressions of all this material we find:-
not much interest in the topic amongst m.’magements or
employees;
some interest in the EEC Commission and governments
generally, Irelalld’s in particular;
a vast degree of variation in schemes in Ireland and
elsewhere;
a small proportion of firms with I~S in Ireland and no high
percentage anywhere except in France, and fll USA where
it is tax-favoured and involved in fringe benefits;
in Ireland, practising firms have good fringe benefits: we
lifter that PS is widely regarded as an extension of these;
trade unions are disinterested when they are not positively
antagonistic;
broadly there are two types of schemes of deductions from
profit l distributed amongst own staff, 2 contributed to a
gener;al fund for all employees of all firms, 2 being favoured
by trade unions;
experts are generally agreed as to aspirations with regard to
PS but there is an entire absence of statistical proof as to
whether stated objectives have been attained, there being
simply statements that this has been the case usually.
Our title is in the form of a question implying that we seek an answer. This
answer should be Yes, No or Doubtful. For rely choice, reasons should be given. If
Yes the type of scheme favoured should be sketched in broad lines, while recognising
that choice of scheme will depend on company circumstances. We may state at once
that our answer is Yes.
Our mmlysis will be full of value judgements, so deprecated by analysts
seeking proof. To repeat, we have been unable to find statistical proof, little economic
theory and vast variability in scheme detail, this an argument for absence of proof of
theory. So we feel justified in recourse to value judgement, noting the words of the
EEC Commission of Communities in regard to PS "We are of the opinion ....
"
implying value judgemellt. We consider Our judgements to have value, more value than
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most as resulting from months of reflection and study. We will be well content
if the opinions in this section and in the paper generally (the other sections of
which consisting almost entirely of statistical and other facts) will polarize discussion,
even if most other opinions differ from ours.
I~S in its origins was idealistic, paternalistic and generally charitable
in its intent. Tending towards the economic were the objects of increased saving,
increased labour productivity, improved industrial relations, distributive justice,
with diminution generally of the two-sided industrial philosophy within the firm.
Collectively these objects, insofar as they are attainable, would go some way towards
justifying PS. Can we produce any further argumentation that PS is in accordance
with the natural law? Can we ascertain or set limits to the just rewards of those
entitled to a share of VA in an individual enterprise ?
Very eaxly on we came to the conclusion that PS was but a small p,-Lrt of the
important topic of participation, implying the question of the share of employees in
ownership and management of the firm. Taking a stand mainly on ethical grotmds we
have not the smallest doubt that ox~ership and management should be widely distributed
amongst staff, who are vitally concerned in the success and even the survival of the
¯
I
firm. (Happily, ethical judgements are, of necessity, value judgements, not requiring
apology therefore.) We are on record as deprecating these two
sides in industry, al.guing that employees and owners of an enterprise are in the same
boat, This results in demands for employee compensation being to a large extent
independent of the welfare of the firm, sometimes leaving too little for profit on which,
largely through allocations to reserve, the survival of the firm depends. The two-sided
philosophy is fully accepted by management and staff. We do not argue that its
disappearmlce is necessary for participation in general or PS in particular. We do
consider that a better atmosphere in industrial relations than at present is a prior
condition for I~S to take firm hold.
4.3
In its-practical aspect tl~e problem of PS raised the more general question
of the fair division of value added (VA) between owners and staff. Thus some
consideration of VA will be necessary.
VA, the difference between total sales and purchases of goods and services
embodied ii~ these sales, in any period (usually a year but nowadays efficient ficms
use shorter periods for accounting), is the measure of work done by the firm in the
L
period. ’Sales will include value of increase in stocks of goods (products and materials)
during the period; that these unsold elements can be valued in different ways need not
trouble us at this stage. Purchases include a valuation for depreciation (or capital
consumption) as well as repairs and maintenance during the period. Here again there
is an unsold (and hence non-valued) element, namely depreciation. That added value
can have different valuation does not disqualify it from being the fens c_tt or_q_r
~ 
in any
discussion of the distribution of the value of work of the firm. Our argument will
apply however VA is defined. Nor need we be troubled about the fact that levels of
Sales and/or purchases may be subject partly or wholly to monopolistic pressures,
thus increasing or decreasing VA.
For this discussion VA may be regarded as consisting of four main
categories :-
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
employee compensation;
company taxation;
additions to reserves, i.e. company saving;
dividends and interest.
These four categories are set out in their natural order, the order in which
a board of directors usually would consider them. We deal with them in the following
paragraphs, as far as relevant to our inquiry.
(i) Em~yee compensation includ.es overtime and bonus (on turnover or for
productivity etc. - let us exclude bonus in the form of PS for the moment, terming
?
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it "non-PS bonu’~"). Regular pay and overtime are unrelated to outcome in so far
as payments are independent of output or sales of goods or services. Non-PS
bonus on the other hand depends on results, though it may become a routine payment,
at more or less the same rate over a term of years and, as such, indistinguishable
from ordinary pay. If l°S is in operation it would seem to be important for the staff
1o distinguish clearly between such bonus and l°S, if PS is to have any incentive effect
in any direction which, incidentally, will be to the weal of staff as well as shareholders.
There must be no tendency towards confusion of non-PS bonus and PS, especially if
paid in cash, which should be ,an importm~t element in the firm’s publicity of its l°S
scheme. In turn, any such scheme should be voluntarily adopted by the staff, in general
principle and as to the method of distribution. It seems logical and l°S should vary
up or down with profits if it has to have its incentive effects and that this fact should be
accepted by the staff. The same argument migl~t appear applicable to non-PS bonus
"t
but the staff will not look at it that way since such bonus is regarded as part of pay.
There should be no difficulty in distinguishing between PS and other bonus (and one
might add pension and other fringe benefits) if each is an absolute value or a fixed
percentage of a relevant financial entity.
For’owners, staff are a cost like materials. The question stands; is this
attitude, apart from the moral aspect, in the interest of the firm? The attitude is
also enshrined in the practice of professional accountancy, for whom the appropriation
account begins with trading profit. Within the logic of VA it would seem that the account
should open witl{ employee remuneration. Indeed, very much more information,
statistical in character, is required than accountants usually supply to increase profit.
These statistics could be based on data the firm must supply, sometimes at considerable
cost, to the statistical authorities and which could be used with little extra expense by
the firm, to increase its efficiency.
We have become so accustomed to (ii) company tmxati0n that we have ceased
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to realize how odd it is. It started in World War I and amounted for many years to
about one-haft of company profit before tax, but has latterly tended to diminish. It
is really a phenomenon associated with the transition of the firm from private owner-
ship to joint stock status. It obviously entails double taxation on both staff and
stocld~olders, the alleged owners (but with least control, of those involved in running
the company, ff non-executive), both groups of whom have also to pay personal
income tax. Nowadays the private owner still pays only a single (Schedule A or B)
tax, as is equitable. We shall not pursue this aspect which we assume will be dealt
with by the recently appointed Commission on Taxation. During the last few years,
government and EEC subsidies to firms tlave become ’so common that the relevant
figure may be taxation minus subsidy. The point is that with the advent of PS, taxation
and subsidy, hitherto irrelevant, have entered the orbit of interest of workpeople and
their TUs.
The foregoing are mainly explanatory comments of the fo~{r categori6s of
VA. Something on these lines would be absolutely necessary in any colfference between
staff representatives and management in the determination of rules for PS. Indeed,
explanations by management should extend far further ,and in great detail, for instance
to planning, external constraints ere (to the absolute limit of prudent cmffidentiality)
in the interest of the firm, mid quite apart from PS.
These remarks are a preparation for coping with the problem stated at the
outset of this chapter which amounts to finding an equitable division of VA between
labour mid capital. Really it is VA’less company taxation which is the sum to be
divided, for the 1Revenue Commissioners will have immutable rules for determining
their share, beyond the control of the firm or its employees. The problem as we
envisage it is one confronting a firm which has decided to adopt PS. Are there mW
rules for deciding the amount of the share ?
There is a very strong tendency for basic wages of workpeople with given
occupation to be the same in all employments. This is mainly a result of unionization
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with its collective agreements sometimes of nationwide scope. In addition to the
workpeople there are the manageriall clerical and teclmical staff. Though some of
these may have their TUs there will be far less uniformity between firms in their
basic pay. As to earnings of workpeople, which to repeat, will include oval%line pay
and bonuses in addition to basic pay, this will vary positively with the profitability
but not nearly as much as the statistic VA per person engaged which can vary between
firms in the ratio 4:1 in each type of Irish industry.
The survival of the firm depends on (iii) additions to reserves. In the opinion
of many economists, survival interests most firms rather than maximization of profit,
the character of profit being essentially that of a residual which depends so much on
matters outside the control of management and staff. Profit is a random variable.
Self-financing of capital development is far preferable to borrowing at the usurious level
of interest rates of the last few years. In strict logic staff should be regarded as part-
owners of allocations to reserve, after PS is adopted in principle.
As regal-ds (iv), dividends and interest, interest will be absolutely determined
by the amount of the loan to the form and the rate of interest. The lender will almost
invariably be a bank and the amount ~md rate of interest will depend on the lender’s
assessment of the borrower’s credit. Dividend itself is usually exprcssed as a rate
on capital invested originally, which capital is deemed to be a loan to the company,
regarded as a corporate entity. While individual companies try to keep this rate of
dividend approxhnately level (sometimes by withdrawals from or additions to reserves)
there is considerable variation (sometimes the rate is zero) over the years and much
greater variation in rate between compm~ies. Investment in equities is largely a gamble,
much more so thin1 investment in bonds with rate of interest predetermined, but the value
of the investment itself is liable to fluctuate inversely with the B’ank l~ate (or other
minimum lending rate). For large stockholders buy and sell stock for profit or to avoid
loss on the fluctuating price of the stock. There are two elements in the earnings of
equities and bonds, dividends (or i~terest) and profit (or loss) on sale.
To whom should be given the credit and hence the reward for an
Increase in VA? Investigation may show that this was due to some or all
of a great variety of causes including (i) increased sates fr.om contracts won
by sales force supplemented by other staff’s wmJ~.ing harder to meet conditions
of contract, (ii) increased prices of products or lower prices of materials,
(iit) increased labour productivity, (iv) more modern machinery and instruments
etc. The short answer is therefore that it would be quite impossible to apportion
fair shares amongst shareholders and the different kinds of skiff. The argument
is the stronger for the fact that the increased profit may be due entirely to
increased demand, whether this was or was not anticipated by the firm in
the pre-determination of the kind of goods or services produced.
A further complication is that the two sides in the modern joint
stock company are rightly seen to be management and labour, not employer
and staff. But management (which may include several individuals in the firm)
is itself part of staff as on a basic income, possibly with additional compensation
analogous to workpeopte’s overtime and bonus. Managemcnt’s essential rote
of decision making is largely in its hands. It would seem that no section of
the staff can lay exclusive claim to increased VA in a firm.
’j
But what of the rights of non-executive shareholders, assuming Nat
there was no change in their investment during the year?
Trade unionism as a philosophy is opposed to differentiation in
reward between individuals in .a group. We would agree to the extent that it
may be impossible to apportion credit to individuals, amongst whom there will
always be a best and an acceptable worst. One conclusion is fl~at any distribution
by way of bonus on PS should be proportional to the basic remuneration of each
of members of tim staff, m~ accepted measure of her/his contribution to VA, with
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abandonment of effort to ascertain what the true contribution of each individual
or group is. Even if this were possible, differentiation in relative reward would
lead to discontent.
If PS is to be widely adopted it must be accepted by trade unions, in principle
and in detail of plan. Trade unions at present tend to disapprove of profit sharing
schemes, particularly share-holding schemes as workers’ insecurity may be increased
if the employing firm gets into difficulties. They fear that employees in labour-
intensive industries would not be included in profit sharing or would get very much
less return than in capital-intensive enterprises. It should be possible to evolve a
scheme of profit sharing, however, so that the proportion of profits distributed to
employees is higher in labour-intensive industries - not that the individual will receive
more but the total bonus will be adequate for sharing among a greater mm~ber of
,
staff. Unions tend to regard profit sharing schemes as "sharing" in a limited way
as the principles and administration of such schemes is usually entirely in the hands
of man~ngement with very little sharing of power - in most cases none. Unions also
argue that, because of the degree of profit sharing usually envisaged, profit sharing
schemes contribute little to a more equitable distribution of wealth in society. Unions
object to the implicit idea that workers employed in unprofitable organisations should
be punished. They also argue that inequalities arise, as profit sharing cannot be
applied to the public sector. Such schemes are not seen by trade unionists as a
satisfactory substitute for good pension and sickness provisions, nor are they a
substitute for a sound industrial relations programme. They do not like individual
allocations according to seniority, which may not necessarily reflect the individual’s
co,~tribution to the success of the enterprise. Union objections are rational and mus~
be met for PS to be successful.
The French formula considered in section 1 has been shown to be largely successful
in this.
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An editorial inThe Irish Times* has a bearing on the equity of ps. It
is suggested therein that the security of tenure issue of the modern industrial worker
(instancing workers in the ]British steel industry, on strike at the moment or writing,
partly because of tlu~eatened redundancy) is analogous to that of the Irish tenant
farmer of a century ago, who could be evicted for non-payment of rent. The cases
certainly are similar in that insecurity of tenure was or is a characteristic of both.
The editorial goes on to point out that agrarian turmoil ended with the Land Acts where-
by tenants acquired a legal equity in their holdings. The implication is that workers’
acquisition of an equity in their companies (implied by PS) would lead to industrial
peace; the editorial is doubtful about this outcome. To the m~alogy it might have been
added that in modern business the non-executive shareholder could be cast in the role
of the absentee landlord of the land wars. Analogies are not proofs. We shall not
venture to anticipate the verdict in a court of law of a case that the worker was part-
-owner of the business he worked in; we suspect it would be unfavourable. The law,
governed largely by the Companies Acts, is overwhehningly on the side of the owners.
The owner might argue that the worker’s rewards, by trade union pressure have lowered
profits (i.e. interest on capital) inequitably, the truth of which remains to be seen.
Is a’fair division conceivable of VA between employees and owners ? We
think so. ]But there must be far greater frankness on the part of owners with
employees and their trade unions about the financial condition, plans and prospects
of the firm, told improved goodwill on both sides, than has heretofore been the
case.
Since capital intensity varies so much between firms and industries, a
fixed percentage of VA (less tax), generally applicable, would be inequitable. The
greater the capital the greater the investment and the greater should be the reward
* Issue of 25 February 1980.
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of the investors. (It has been shown elsewhere that, with industries as
units, the greater capital per employee the greater are earnings per
employee.) We have seen that it would be impossible to attribute credit for
improved VA to individual employees or their groups. But can we regard
employee compensation in all forms as a residual of VA less company tax
after ascertafllable provision for allocations to reserve and dividends ?
We have pointed out that survival is a major, ff not the major,
concern of any business. Employees, managementand owners will agree
that reserves are necessary for survival which is presumably in the hlterest
of both sides. But will there be agreement as to the amount to be allocated
or withdrawn in a particular year, agreement, that is, between all parties
concerned with survival (which includes improvement), embracing, of course,
employees or their representatives ? Good management, the very word survival
itself implies planning for years ahead, including financial planning. We think
that in a proper atmosphere there could be agreement as to reserve policy.
In section 2 we show that the reward of an investor of £i00 for a
’I
year in an Irish company depends very much more on change of price during
a year than on dividend. We suspect that, while price of stock depends on
change in dividend, this relationship is not very strong. There is a marked
tendency for prices of equities to move en bloc.
Equities and fixed interest bearing bonds are traded as if they were
commodities, i.e. with constantly changing prices. Our investor with £I00 is
confronted with the free choice of equity or bond. Both cm~ change in price but
the likelihood is that file change up or down by year-end will be far greater in
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the case of equity choice. Can the equity holder, confronted with a sharing of
profit with employees, effectively argue that because of uncertainty of reward,
he is entitled to a higher rate of dividend than if he had invested in a bond?
We do not think so. We consider that the market takes this element
into account. The bond yield must he high enough already to compete with
anticipated equity yield to acquire the amounts that bond sellers need. This
might not be the case if investors in equities and bonds were separate or nearly
separate categories. This may be true of individual investors but stock
markets are dominated by great institutional funds, pensions, insurances etc.
and even banks; these, once predominant in bonds, have now moved strongly
into equities. The rate of interest on bonds in particular may give some indication
of the minimal rate to which the equity holder is entitled.
We consider therefore that a full scale inquiry into profits in
Ireland would shed much light on the ascertainment of a minimum rate of
return to o~arners of capital investment, minimal in the sense that it must
be ea~_med before any PS distribution.
be confined to such minimum rate.
But, of course, dividends must not
In France, where PS is mandatory,
excess profit eve/~ a basic minimum is divided between workpeople and
owners by formula. In such an enquiry the cooperation of the Revenue
Commissioners would be necessary, especially as regards private companies
and partnerships which constitute the bulk of Irish business. Of course if
PS is legally adopted as a policy there will probably be lower limit for size.
We see no reason for any such limit, for voluntary application, always
assumi]~g that a-PS policy is found recommendable for Irelm]d.
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We conclude by asserting that a widespread plarl for PS should be set
up in Irelmld because it is equitable that employees should be part owners of
enterprises. There are other arguments on balm]ce favouring PS but equity is
by far the most important, in our view. While we appreciate the force of
arguments favouring a scheme for contributions from profit to a central fund
for sharing with all the nation’s employees we consider that for the present in
Ireland the U.K. type of plan is most suitable, firmly centred, as regards
funding, control and distribution of own shares, in the particular firm. We set
down for discussion other recommendations as follows:-
¯ °
the scheme should be voluntary for the present;
a PS bill should be prepared in consultation with employer mad
employee organisations;
contributions should be tax-deductible as regards firms and
individual employees for schemes approved by the IRcvenue
Commission;
schemes should involve the setting-up of a fund within the
firm to receive cash contributions, employees being consulted
on the setting up of any scheme and represented on the board
of the fund;
¯ while employees can choose to have contributions in cash or
shares, share-holding should be strongly favoured by tax-policy;
arrangement should be made for the time for the individual
employeeTs coming into possession of shares as short as possible;
the scheme .should ext end in principle to all employees with as
few exclusions as possible;
PS contributions should not be discretionary on the part of manage-
ment but according to rules or formulae determined by agreement
with staff in advance;
employees with shares in the firm should have shareholder~ rights
in full;
on leaving the firm without discredit the ex-employee should
receive his full entitlement from the fund;
for the present PS contributions should be particular to the firm
determined as half the residual of VA after tax told after pay (including
fringe benefits), allocation to reserve and reward to capital
calculated at mininmm government bond rate.
-The last proposed condition has the attraction that it recognises the basic
rights of both sides, capital and labour, before determination of residue which, it
is proposed, should be equally divided (for wmlt of a better rule). As shown in
section 2, many irish firms do not earn the minimum government bond rate on
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capital invested m~d so would not be liable for PS, using this formula; only
successful firms would be so liable. We propose the scheme with no special
conviction for discussion. The French statutory formula we examined in section
i implies that no PS is necessarily payable (by firms with i00 employees or
more) unless interest on capital exceeds 5 per cent which, of course, is far
lower than present day bond rates; the French formula has a much wider
catchment area than that which we propose; while, as we have shown, the French
formula nearly achieves equal rewards to staff in low and high capital - intensive
firms (as favoured by trade unions) we do not consider it suitable for adoption
in Ireland at the present stage. The simplest system of all would be a straight
contribution, say 5 per cent, from profit, perhaps after the deductions specified.
Choice of formula will be for high level consideration involving government and
organisations of employees and employers. The tax system cml help selection
of favoured formula, for instance no tax concessions unless deductions exceed
x per cent. In frank discussion of the fair division of VA, allocations to reserve
seems likely to give most trouble, since they must differ from year to year and
firm to firm.
Prbfit sharing is but a single detail in the immensely more important
problem of employee involvement in the welfare of their enterprise, but it may be
a necessary condition.
Appendix
g
Profit sharing in each of 22 Irish compm~ies
Company No. I is a services sector organisation, having 25 per cent of equity
held outside the Republic of Ireland. Total employment is approximately 8,000
of whom 7,300 are in a profit sharing scheme. The remainder are manual
workers who have a bonus scheme, not related to profits. The company was
a public company. The organisation has two types of profit sharing:-
(i) a bonus, which is paid annually provided there is a profit, and open to all
7,300 "non-manual" workers
(ii) a share-option scheme which was irreguiar - only happened twice since
1967; available also to "non-manual" staff.
Although a form of profit sharing in bonus form existed for many years, the term
"profit sharing" was not associated with the schemes until 1973/74. Some of the
procedures associated with the bonus scheme appear to come into the category of
productivity rather than profit sharing concepts but as the organisation regarded the
whole scheme as being contingent on making profit, and as there appear to be many
" definitions of profit sharing, it seems to the interviewer, that such schemes should
be included in a study of profit sharing in Ireland. The organisatioa did not wish to
give precise details of the schemes because of confident.iality. In the case of the
bonus paid annually, although the organisation had to make a profit,    the total
~.
bonus available for distribution was not first formally calculated. The amount paid to
individual staff varied according to grade and also included a basic merit bonus,
therefore witl~in the same grade, because of flexibility for merit, the employee
J
could receive from2~-%     to 5% of salary. Efforts were made to keep the decisions
regarding "merit" as objective as possible but there was some dissatisfaction with this
basis of measurement. The bonus scheme was formalised in 1973/74.
The share option offer of ordinary shares was made available twice to
x
employees once in 1967 and again in 1977; on both occasions the organ[sat[on was
invoh, ed in issuing shares and staff were given the opportunity to participate in
buying shares at slightly more favourable terms than those available to existing
!
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shareholders. The organisation advanced loans tostaff who Wished to buy
the shares, repayable over five years; staff could not sell the shares until the end
of a five year period, The amount of shares available to individuals varied; the
percentage available was higher for senior grade staff than for junior grades and
the amount was a percentage of salary e.g. could be 5% of salary for higher grades
and 2~% of salary for lower grades. For the first 5,years dividends went to pay off
the loans. For both bonus and share option schemes the minimum period of service
for qualificdtion was one year - the formula was slightly different but, in effect,it was
at least one year before a new staff member would participate. :Profit sharing schemes
were initiated by management without prior consultation with staff; shares were
confined to the organisation’s own shares. Management sent out communications to
staff regarding profit sharing and explaining the scheme but it was felt that perhaps
they could have done better in this regard.
The questionnaire gave Several options which might’have prompted the
organisation to embark on a profit sharing scheme. Lessening absenteeism did not
appear to be relevant but although the questionnaire did not include "motivation", this
organisation like others thought it important. They also included distributive justice,
industrial relations and efficiency. It was felt that these objectives had been partly
attained only; this was due, in the case of the bonus scheme, to the fact that cash,
when paid once, comes to be expected - almost as part of salary. In the case of the
share options, due to the 5 year wait until the shares became the property of the
individual and also that tax had to be paid when the shares were taken up, staff did not
really identify with the company as co-owners. It was stated that if the tax legislation
were amended for staff buying shares, (as e.g. in the UK where tax becomes due onlywhen
full ownership is acquired), there would be a demand for share ownership in the company.
It was felt that staff identify more with the organisatlon if they became shareholders
and it would be good for the company also to have staff savings invested in the cnterprise
rather than having them spent outside. On leaving or retirement staff had to wait till
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the end of the 5-year period to obtain t:heir shares. The organisatton did not
use profit sharing to finance fringe benefits; staff had pension schemes and
help with loans for house purchase.
ComPany :No. 2 is in the services sector, the subsidiary of a UK company. Staff
totalled 160 approximately of whom about 145 were in the profit sharing scheme.
A cash bonus is paid to all staff; in addition to cash, executive directors had a share
option s cheme.
Directors’ cash bonuses are directly related to before tax profit of the company
but most employees who in any way influence profitability are "rewarded by
performance bonuses". Bonuses vary according to the individual functional
responsibility which may be measurable directly as in the case of salesmen or diverse
as in the case of technicians, whose bonus may be calculated in direct proportion to the
income of the organisation or alternatively as a share in a pool, where the amount is
"calculated by reference to a team performance formula.
, There was no minimum period of service for qualification to avail of the profit
sharing schemes and in the case of bonus schemes there was no minimum profit
necessary before the bonus was awarded. In the last financial year 15 per cent of
¯
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before tax profits was distributed under the cash bonus scheme; this was allocated to
individuals according to their efforts, performance and job; employees set their own
targets to maximise the bonus. The bonus was paid yearly for most staff. Directors
were paid bonuses according to a target; they could receive a bonus of up to 25% of
salary but the bonus could be nil if the individual director (executive) achieved only
75 per cent of the target. Executive directors also had options to purchase shares
at a small discount; these shares which could be sold immediately, were issued to
individuals only, had a dividend paid an{~ually and shares were offered annually, and it
was necessary that a minimum profit should be obtained by the company before shares
were allocated. The scheme is confined to the company’s own shares. The profit
4sharing scheme was initiated in 1965 in the case of bonus and in 1968 for the
executive directors share option facility. When employees retire or leave
the organisation they are given their proportion of the profit Which they have
earned up to the date of leaving. Employees benefit from a pension scheme,
income continuance (long term’ disability) scheme, voluntary health contributions
are paid for the employee and family members in addition to the bonus scheme.
The management initiated the scheme for reasons of distributive justice, efficiency,
motivation (which had a high priority). Industrial relations reasons were not
regarded as important while it was not felt that absenteeism was relevant in the
context of profit sharing. It was felt that the objectives had been attained; management
had the target of finding the method whereby typing staff could be brought into the
scheme; the difficulty was seen to be one of measurement of performance.
Company No. 3 is in the distribution sector with a total employment of approximately
230 people. The profit sharing scheme is in the form of a cash bonus and
applied to 30 managerial and executive staff. The company is a public company,
subsidiary to a larger public company. In the past financial year about 6 per cent
of after tax profit was distributed among staff and executive directors. (Other staff
were paid a Christmas bonus, not related to profit).
/
The profit sharing (cash bonus)scheme began in 1933; there is participation
of employees in the profit sharing allocation. A minimum profit has to be made before
the allocation. There is a separate formula for management staff, distinct from
directors’ share. Management receive 1 per cent of salary for each £x of profit;
directors receive {% up to £4x plus ¼% on next £3x plus 3/8% on next £3x; they
cannot receive any percentage above that amount of profit.
The company has a contributory pension scheme and an income continuance
scheme in addition to profit sharing.    The chief reason for the scheme was industrial
relations and the other reason distributive justice. It was felt that the objectives had
been attained.
5.Company No. 4 is a manufacturing and distributive company with a total staff
of 115. Profit sharing was confined to managerial and executive staff totalling
12.    The company is quoted on the stock exchange and is a subsidiary of a
larger group, 39 per cent of the equity being held outside Ireland.
The profit sharing scheme comprised a cash bonus for managerial staff
and shares and bonus for executive directors. Shares were allocated free of
charge and were in the company itself. Although the profit sharing scheme did not
specify a minimum period of service for qualification, in fact all recipients were
"long serving". W2~en employees left the company either on retirement or on
transfer to another lob, managerial staff received a bonus pro rata to the time
when they left. Executive directors could keep their shares.
There was not a trust for holding shares, allocations were made to individuals.
The bonus based on profits was paid to managerial staff yearly; the share allocation
was a once off occurrence. Allocations were made before tax, and a minimum
(unspecified) profit had to be reached before profit sharing was contemplated. The
cash bonus was usually 5 per cent of salary. Shares allocated were ordinaryshares
and there was not an imposition of a minimum holding time, shares could be sold when
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the recipient wished.
The company considered that motivation was an important reason for
introduction of profit sharing; they also gave a high priority to increas [ng efficiency.
It was considered that the objects had been attained although as the scheme had been
introduced only in 1978 for the cash bonus and 1979 for shares, it was a little soon to
measure results. The company also had a pension scheme for employees.
\
6Compa.ny No. 5. is in the services sector employing approximately 7,500
people, A bonus scheme based on profits was operational since 1950. The
firm is constituted as an Irish public company. All staff receive the cash bonus
which is allocated yearly. The amount is related to grade and salary; the minimum
period of service for qualification is one year. The cash bonus scheme was
introduced by management without consultation with staff.
In addition to the cash bonus scheme, a share option scheme was implemented
in 1978, without commitment to a similar option at any speci£ic time. The share
option allocation was available to all staff but the number of shares available to
staff members increased according to grade and salary. The minimum period of
qualification for participation in the share option was one year, s service. Shares had
to be held for five years after they were taken up; this was mostly due to the fact
that stare could receive loans from the organisation to enable them to purchase the
-shares. The shares available were ordinary shares of the company; staff were able
to purchase them at a discount. Employees were not concerned in the management
of the scheme although they were consulted prior to its implementation.
Allocations were made ¯before tmx in the case of both bonus and share options
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the shares being available at a discount.
Management communicated details of the bonus and share option schemes
to staff directly and at staff meetings. The principal reasons for inaugurating profit
sharing were motivation, giving staff a feeling of ownership in the ~ompany and industrial
relations, although the latter was not felt to be a major factor.
The company had a pension scheme for employees, medical benefits, loans
to enable-employees to purchase shares.
7Company No. 6 is a subsidiary of a parent company based outside Ireland.
The prol:!t sharing schemes apply to all 220 employees. There is a cash bonus
scheme and a share option scheme; employees may take up the options or not;
the cash bonus is awarded yearly to all employees. In fact about 70% take up the
share options; this may be influenced by the fact that loans on favourable terms
are granted to employees to enable them to purchase the shares.
Snares involved in tile scheme do not vary according to the category¯ of
employee.    The profit share allocated in both shareand bonus schemes is based
on total profits of the ultimate parent company, not of the subsidiary Irish company.
There are no part time employees in the organisatton. Staff must have at
least one year’s service in order to qualify for a bonus and three year’s service
for the share option scheme. When shares are taken up they cannot be sold for a
period of five years ; this rule is imposed because loan facilities are granted for taking
shares and are repayable over five years.
When employees retire or leave the organtsatton, they receive a pro-rata
proportion of the annual bonus. If they have purchased shares outright, they may take
shares with them but if not completely paid for, payment must be completed before the
shares can be sold.
Shares are issued to individual employees from time to t;ime. Bonus payments
are made annually.
Share allocations are of ordinary shares. The profit of the parent company
must exceed a stated amount before any share options are granted.
The profit sharing schemes were started in 1974 on the initiative of management.
Communication is individual. The company introduced profit sharing schemes
for reasons of distributive justice,
industrial relations reasons.
productivity, profit and to a lesser extent for
8When questioned about the attainment of the objectives, the eoncensus
was that employees had become accustomed to the annual cash l~onus and regarded
it almost as part of pay. The granting of share options was considered to be
reasonably effective.
The organ[sation has a non-contributory pension scheme.
.Company No. 7 is in the services sector; a company based in Ireland with
16 per cent of the equity held outside the State. Total employment was 600.
The bonus scheme is not strictly speaking profit sharing but was an hmentive bonus
for some categories of employees. The profit sharing scheme applied to senior
management only and was in the form of an option to purchase ordinary shares;
employees were granted loans over a four year repayment period. Shares could
not be sold immediately the option was exercised but could be sold at the rate of
25 per cent a year over a period of four years.
When an employee resigns from the organisation or retires, he may retain
his shares but must repay any outstanding loan before leaving.
The total amount of bonus and loans allocated amounted to approximately
4 per cent of the before tax l~rofits. The share option allocation was according to
¯ I
seniority, pay, grade of job and for individual merit.
Profit sharing started in 1978 on the initiative of management. Communication
with staff was by means of staff meetings, written memorandum and direct contact
with individuals.
The objectives of the organisation in introducing profit sharing were,
distributive justice, industrial relations,efficiency, profit, competitiveness. It was
felt that the objectives had been attained.
The orgaaisation has a staff pension scheme, in addition to loans for the
purpose of purchasing shSres under the share option scheme.
Company No. 8_8_ is a manufacturing organisation w~th a total of 2,500 employees.
The company is the subsidiary of a parent company based outside the State. All
employees are in the profit sharing scheme, which was introduced in 1964 in the
form of an annual bonus. Part of each year’s profit, calculated according to a
clearly defined formula is divided amongst employees of the participat[ng
companies.
The profit sharing scheme is available to all employees below I~oard level,
who are permanently employed~provided both the full time and part time staff member
has completed one working month’s service. The agreed profit share for any year
is calculated before tax.    The.amount agreed is divided among staff in proportion
to the basic pay and related to the length of service during that year.
Since 1980 a stock option scheme has been introduced, wh[ch is available
to employees who have been employed for 3 years previous to the allocation. If the
staff member retires or leaves during the year, he may take up a pro-rata option.
Employees can also take up the stock [n lieu of the existing bonus scheme, although
a defined minimum of stock must be taken up. There is a further option to take a
mix of the stock and bonus up to the defined maximum.
¯ I
Regarding the bonus there is no variation in the scheme according to type of
employee.     The bonus is pro-rata up to the date of leaving the organisation.
Employees do t~ot participate in the management of either scheme; the schemes were
introduced by management without staff participation. Communication regarding the
profit sharing is directly to individuals by means of a booklet; there are annual
meetings with staff to explain how the amounts are calculated. The objects of the
profit sharing schemes are stated to be the strengthening of the existing sense of team
spirit and mutual goodwill, the encouragement of participation in the company’s affairs
and the pl-ovision of an additional incentive to co-operate in improving overall
efficiency to the mutual benefit of all.
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Company No. 9 is a subsidiary of a public manufacturing company with 100%
o_f equity held outside the State..    The scheme covers all staff and is the form
of a Cash bonus available to all staff, part time and full time from the date of
commencement of employment or beginning of the bonus year; payment is made
twice ~,early and is before tax.
The organtsatton must make a minimum profit before a bonus is allocated;
the decision to allocate is not discretionary, although there is not active participation
of employees in the management of the bonus.. The profit sharing scheme was
initiated by management. Employees were consulted before the scheme was initiated.
The amount allocated is a percentage of pay; the scheme commenced in 1979.
The benefits of profit sharing were expl.atned by notices on boards, and staff meetings
of small groups to whom the management outlined the scheme.
The objectives of the organisation in introducing profit sharing were distributive
justice, industrial relations, efficiency, profit.    The firm considered that these
objects had all been achieved in part but perhaps not fully yet. The firm had other
fringe benefits, namely a pension scheme and medical benefits.
.Company NO. 10 is in the services sector, a subsidiary of a public company situated
outside the State (100 per cent o£ equity held outside the State). The total number
of employees of the company is 2~700, all of whom share in the profits. Although
the parent company has a share option scheme, the form of prof.it sharing in the State,
(because of tax difficulties) is a cash bonus based on group profits but financed by the
Irish subsidiary profits. The amount available for distribution is clearly defined and
is distributed annually according to pay. When emplwees leave the organtsation
there is no furthm: entitlement to profit sharing. Employees do not share in the
management of the profit sharing scheme,which was initiated by management without
consultation with employees. Inl!ormation regarding the scheme is by means of
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staff meetings and circulars to staff. The objects of the organisation in implementing
a profit sharing scheme are, distributive justice, industrial relations, efficiency.
Management find it difficult to assess whether these objectives have been attained
but they "consider that there are ongoing benefits".
The firm has a pension scheme and grants loans at concessionary rates for
certain categories of staff.
Company No. 11 is in the manufacturing sector, is a subsidiary of a public company
with 51 per cent of the equity held outside the State. Total employment is 217 but
only 12 managerial and executive employees are involved in the profit sharing scheme
which is in the form of an annual cash bonus; full time staff only are eligible; the
minimum period of service for qualification is 5 y.ears. When employees leave the
organisatton they receive a pro-rata amount. The bonus is 10% of pay provided there
-.is a minimum profit. Employees do not share in the management of the Profit Sharing
scheme which was initiated by management, without prior consultation with employees.
The object of the organtsation in introducing the scheme was efficiency,
which has been achieved.    The firm also has pension and medical schemes.
/"
Company No. 12 is both manufacturing and distributive with a total employment of
1,800. Five per cent of the equity of the firm (a public, principal company) is held
outside the State. Profit sharing is by means of a share option scheme to purchase
ordinary shares of the company and employees, other than directors, now own about
7~ per cent of the equity. About 400 staff participate in the option covering all grades
of emplwees. The initial share optidn was in 1977 but there have been some
rights issues since that date. Shares were allocated to employees at a discount
(£I per share when the market price was £i. 82). The employee must be 25 years of age
but there is no qualifying minimum service. Shares must be held for five years,
this is usually because loans are issued to employees to enable them to take up the
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option, repayments are normally spread over 5 years. The loan must be
cleared before the staff member can sell tlm shares. The organisation does not
specify a minimum profit which must be attained before a share option is issued.
Allocation of shares is 9 per cent of salary but an employee cannot take up more
than £2,500 ill £1 shares. Shares are valued at the time of disposal.
The profit sharing¯ scheme was initiated by management without consultation
with employees and is confined to the firm’s own shares. Communication regarding
¯ the share option scheme is by staff meetings and at individual level. The company
objects in introducing profit sharing were distributive justice, industrial relations,
efficiency, profit. It was considered that industrial relations had improved since the
scheme was introduced. The firm has a pension scheme and issues loans to buy
the company’s share either under the share option scheme or at full price on the
open market.
Company No. 13 is in the services sector, a principal public company with 100 per
cent of the equity held outside the State. Total employment is 90; although all categories
of st,’fff are eligible for profit sharing, in fact 70 employees are in the scheme.
:Profit sharing is in two categories - a cash bonus and a share oi~ion scheme.
\
An employee can accept the bonus and use the money to purchase shares in the company
with a maximum of 500 shares. Shares must be purchased directly on the market
by staff.
The minimum qualification for either scheme is one complete year’s service.
Shares must be held for 5 years and can be retained when an employee resigns or
retires.
Shares become the property of an employee immediately the share option is
exercised or the cash bonus granted. The cash bonus is allocated after tax.
Employees do not participate in tlfe management of profit sharing which
13
b
w
was initiated by management without prior staff consultation.
Profit sharing commenced in 1978 and is a percentagd of pay in both
forms (bonus and share option). The scheme is made known by means of direct
communication to each staff member.
The organisation introduced profit sharing for reasons of distributive justice
and motivation; it is difficult to measure whether the motivation has been achieved.
The company has a pension and medical schemes.
Company No. 14 is involved in the manufacture and distribution sectors. It is a
principal public company with 900 employees. Fifty one per cent of the equity is
held outside the State. There is a bonus scheme based on profits and a share
option scheme, available to 40 managerial, and executive staff including executive
directors. The company considers that the bonus scheme is now regarded by the
¯ employees concerned as part of salary. The share option scheme is usually
available annually, shares being normally offered at a discount. There is no minimum
period of service for qualification to participate in the scheme in the defined categories.
Shares, once purchased, must beheld for four years, after which shares may
1.
be sold over a three year period at a rate not exceeding on,third each full year.
When an employee resigns from the company if part or all of his share option is not
taken up, it is at the discretion of the Board of Directors whether he is permitted to
take up tim balance. In the case of death or retirement the balance of shares outstanding
would be permitted to be taken up.
When the share option scheme was introduced in 1975 a certain amount of
share capital was allocated to the share option scheme. There is thus a reserve of
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shares available for distribution.    Shares are allocated according to seniority and
performance. Staff do not share in the management of the Scheme which was initiated
by the Board of Directors. The share option is confined to shares in the company.
oThe principal objective in introducing the profit sharing scheme was to retain
managerial staff with the company; the ide~. appears to have "been successful.
The firm has a contributory pension scheme, pays Voluntary Health insurance
contributions on behalf of staff and allocates some cash bonuses with discretion.
Company No. 15 is in the manufacturing sector and is a public company with
¯ 5 per cent of the equity held outside the State. Total employment is 600; all
full time staff are eligible for inclusion in the profit sharing plan; the minimum
service qualification is one year. Employees do not contribute to the shares which
are the ordinary shares of the firm. The scheme was inaugurated in 1971.
Shares may be sold immediately. When employees leave the firm they
have the option to keep the shares if they wish. Dividends are paid twice yearly.
Share allocations are made after tax. Amounts are allocated according to seniority.
The dividend may vary from year to year and is the same as that granted to other
shareholders. Employees do not participate in the management of the profit sharing
which was initiated by management without employee consultation., Information
regarding profit sharing is communicated directly to individuals. The company
object in introducing profit sharing was for good industrial relations, of which
I.
management doubt the success. A pension scheme and medical scheme are in
operation.
Company No, 16 is a subsidiary of a public company eat[rely owned by investors
within the State, in the manufacturing sector. Total employment is 350. The
profit sharing scheme is that of a bonus based on profits but in a form somewhat
different to tha~ which normally obtains in Irish firms. The terms are that "if the
budget profit is achieved senior and middle management may receive a profit share
bonus at the discretion of the ]3oard".
15
a
w
The number of employees in the scheme is about 40. The minimum
period of servicc for qualification is on___.~e year. When an employee retires or
resigns he would be paid pro-rata for service during the year. :Payment is
yearly subject ton minimum profit. The scheme commenced in 1976. The
amount payable is calculated as a percentage of salary.
The scheme was initiated by management without consultation with employees.
Details of the scheme are communicated to individuals. The company objects in
introducing the profit sharing scheme were efficiency and profit; these objects have
not been attained. The firm also operates pension and medical schemes.
Company No. 17 is in the services sector. It is a subsidiary of a public company;
:I00 per cent of the equity is held outside the State. The scheme is based on the
profits of the parent group with employees in the Irish subsidiary having an option to
receive their distribution either in cash or ordinary shares of the parent company.
Total employment is approximately 600. The profit sharing scheme is confined
to full time employees who have been in service for one scheme year. It was
introduced in 1975. There are 524 employees in the scheme.
Sha~:es allocated to staff must be held for two years at least before selling.
When employees leave the organisation they receive a pro-rata contribution in the
case of a bonus but the two year embargo applies to shares. Shares are in a special
trust set up for employees; shares are handed over to individuals in two years. A
dividend is payable yearly. ~ :
Employees do not participate in the management of the profit sharing allocation;
the schen~ was introduced on the initiative of management without prior consultation
with employees. Allocations are made before tax and a minimum profit is defined
before profit sharing takes place.
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Bonus on shares are allocated according to pay; shares are ordinary
shares in the parenL company.
Pension and cash bonus benefits operate. The object in introduci.ng
profit sharing was efficiency,which cannot yet be measured.
Company No. 18 is in the manufacturing and distribution sectors and is a
principal public company with 2,700 employees; 43 per cent of the equiLy is held
outside the State.
The profit sharing scheme applies to 170 managerial and executive staff
and is by means of share-options. There is a minimum period of service for
qualification to enter the scheme; part time staff are not eligible; shares are issued
to individuals. Employees who avail of the option to purchase shares must hold
50 per cent of their allocation for at least one year; when staff resign or retire the
option to purchase shares ceases, Allocation of shares takes place occasionally,
is discretionary and is made irrespective of any stated minhnum profit. The
scheme was initiated in 1969 by management without prior consultation with employees,
who do not participate in the management of the profit sharing allocation. Amounts
allocated are according to seniority.
The company objects in introducing profit sharing were profit and "greater
involvement"; these objectives have been "partly" realised.
The firm operates also a pension scheme; cash bonus and benefits such as a
company car.
Company No. 19 is in manufacturing and is a subsidiary of a public company; 100 per
cent of the equity is held outside the State. A profit sharing scheme has been in
operation since the early 1920s. "This was normally a fixed percentage of total
remuneration for the previous financial year depending on the profits made by the
companies, and in later years became a percentage of annual remuneration, excluding
overtime.,,
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All employees, except Directors, are included in the scheme which
is in the form of a cash bonus paid annually. In order to qualify for the
inclusion in the bonus employees must have completed a minimum of 6 months
service. Allocations are made before tax and are calculated as a percentage
of pay.
The scheme was started by management without consultation with staff
(which was not unusual in 1925). However, now, the scheme is explained to
employees by notices on boards, communications to individuals and meetings with
staff. The company objects ia having a profit sharing scheme were, distributive
justice, industrial relations, efficiency, lessening absenteeism; these aims are
not being realised. The’firm also has pension and medical schemes.
The following comments are interesting (made to the interviewer). "In earlier
days profit sharing appeared to induce a sense of loyalty, good attendance and
peaceful industrial relations, but as Social Security Benefits, the general level of
salaries/wages, and the standard of living rose, this approach seemed to lose its
impact in the modern work environment".
Company No. 20 is a principal public company with 863 employees in the manufacturing
sector with 35 per Cent of the equity held outside the State.
The profit sharing scheme is available to all employees except Board Members;
the number actually participating is 848. It is a cash bonus scheme. Employees must
have a minimum of six months service to qualify for the allocation which is paid yearly.
When staff leave or retire they are eligible to a pro--rata share relating to the number
of months worked in the year in which they retire. Allocations are made before tax
and are 6{ per cent of pre-tax profits. Amounts allocated are according to pay. The
Scheme commenced in 1975 on the initiative of management; employees were consulted.
Benefits of the profit sha~ing scheme are explained to staff by notices on boards,
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communications to individuals and staff meetings. The objects of the company
in introducing the profit sharing scheme were distributive justice, industrial
relations, the encouragement of employees "to identify clearly with the property
of the company - to which they contribute". It is considered that the objects have
been attained "in so far as they can be measured". The firm has pension and
medical schemes, an incentive bonus for sales representatives, subsidised canteen
facilities and a product allowance scheme.
Company No. 21 is also in the manufacturing sector. It is a subsidiary public
company with 100 per cent of the equity held outside the State and employing 487,
all of whom participate in the profit sharing scheme which is a bonus scheme based
on profits. "The bonus, however, is not an automatic entitlement. It is awarded
at the discretion of the Board (of the subsidiary company) and it is directly related
to the trading results of the Company".
Employees must have a minimum of ol~e year’s service before qualifying
for inclusion in the profit sharing scheme. When they leave or retire they are paid
pro-rata for their service.
z
The bonus is paid twice yearly and is allocated before tax. Amounts are
calculated as a percentage of earnings and were 9 per cent last year.
The scheme was introduced in ]967 by management with the objects of
distribution justice, industrial relations, "reward". It is considered that the objects
have been attained. The firm also has a pension scheme.
Company No. 22 is a principal public company in the manufactu’ring sector with 900
employees.    Approx. 25 per cent of the equity is held outside the State. The company
is in the manufacturing sector.
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The profit sharh~g scheme which was introduced in 1969 covered all
employees. There are now approxhnately 350 staff remaining in the scheme,
which was in the form of an option to purchase ordinary shares in the company.
Shares were not issued at a discount but a loan note scheme covering a
five year period was implemented to enable employees to buy the shares. Staff
had to have a minimum of two years service to participate in the scheme. The
option was issued to individual employees.     To date there has only been the
1969 offer. Shares were valued at a stated conversion price when the Loan Note
was fully paid up. If an employee left the company or retired or died before the
end of the 5 years the Loan Note would be repaid at par.
The purpose of the scheme was "to provide a means whereby employees may
participate in the growth of the company and acquire a shareholdtng which it is hoped
will have a market value greater than its cost". Other objects were improvement
of industrial relations, efficiency, lessening absenteeism. It is difficult to assess
whether the objects have been attained.
The company also operates pension and medical schemes, a productivity
bonus scheme and subsidtsed canteen facilities.
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